Two years ago, New York Governor Patterson convened a task force to examine the status of self-insured trusts for workers comp. He was forced to take action when a number of trusts failed, most notably those administered by Compensation Risk Managers (CRM). The insolvent trusts left behind a deficit of $500 million. (See our prior blogs here and here.) The task force recently presented its findings to the governor. In 189 pages of closely reasoned text, the commission recommends that New York abandon this particular model for insurance. The risks, in their view, outweigh the benefits and perhaps most important, the state lacks the resources to adequately monitor how these groups operate from day to day. You cannot trust the trusts.
The commission zeroed in on what it considers to be the (fatal) flaws in the group trust model:
: Joint and several liability, where prudent employers are held accountable for the actions of the weakest members
NOTE: it’s one thing to have “joint and several” liability; as the commission points out, it’s quite another to actually collect on these obligations: less than 15% of what is owed by participants in the failed trusts has been collected to date.
: potential conflicts of interest involving group administrators and TPAs, who seek to grow the business by keeping rates artificially low and by understating losses
: inability of trustees to understand what is really going on
: inability of the state to monitor and assess the true status of each operating trust
Death Spiral
Self insurance groups currently operate successfully in 18 states, but not in New York. As we pointed out in a prior blog, the NY comp board tried to assess all trust members – not just those in the insolvent trusts – to make up the $500 million deficit. The solvent trusts sued and for the moment, have prevailed. (The Held decision can be read in the appendix of the task force report).
There is a certain logic to assessing all members for the failings of a few, but this only works when you are dealing with very large numbers, so the individual assessments are relatively small. This was not the case back in 2008, when there were about 18,000 employers participating in NY trusts. After all hell broke lose, the number dwindled to 4,000.
The crippling assessments issued by the comp board to cover the trust deficit created a death spiral, with solvent trusts folding their tents and moving out of the state. Even though those assessments have been retracted by the courts, that action comes too late to save the viable trusts. New York probably has no choice but to abandon the group trust model.
Rotten Apples
The New York narrative, as written by the governor’s commission, attributes the trust failures to fatal flaws in the business model. But where New York sees an insurance approach that cannot work, other states see vulnerabilities that can be addressed through prudent management. Self-insured groups still operate profitably and effectively in many states. What happened in New York was the result of rogue and perhaps felonious trust management combined with inadequate state oversight. The state failed to see the true status of the troubled trusts in a timely manner and then took exactly the wrong action to correct it. That’s not a problem with trusts themselves, but with the people entrusted to run them.